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department of the bank to investigate the title and to determine
whether the car was good security. The bank's officer asked the
defendant seller if the title were clear. The seller said it was.
Thereupon plaintiff signed the note and chattel mortgage. The car
in fact was mortgaged and plaintiff had to pay off said mortgage.
She sued defendant seller and joined defendant bank. Upon trial
judgment entered against both defendants, the bank appealed.
This case was reversed as to the bank only, primarily on the
grounds of insufficient pleading to show employment of bank to
examine title in plaintiff's behalf. The Court held that the instruction for such an examination was outside of the employee's duty
in behalf of the bank and, in performing such examination, the
employee became agent of the plaintiff. Any liability resulting from
negligence would be the personal liability of the employee and not
of the bank.

CONTRACTS, AGENCY, SALES AND CORPORATIONS
HARRY A. KING

With exception of the few cases which are hereinafter discussed, the bulk of the decisions by the Supreme Court in the last
year on the questions of contracts, agencies and partnerships, personal property, sales and corporations present examples of the
application of familiar rules of law in differing factual situations.
An interesting case presenting and determining questions of
procedure in administration of estates and primarily involving the
reformation of a contract is that of Holter v. Cozad, 238 P. 2d 190.
The question presented for determination by the Court was whether
or not a contract for the purchase and sale of real property entered
into by a decedent during his lifetime, as the seller, and another, as
the purchaser, might be reformed and specifically performed in the
proceeding to administer the estate of the deceased. The petition to
the County Court for this relief was denied. On an appeal to the
District Court the relief prayed for was granted. On a writ of
error to the Supreme Court it was held that because of the indefiniteness of the description of the property, which was the subject of the contract, that before a specific performance could be
decreed the contract must first be reformed to set forth the real
agreement of the parties. This the County Court was without
jurisdiction to do in the estate proceeding. On the appeal from the
decision of the County Court, the District Court's jurisdiction was
derivative and limited for the purpose of the appeal to the matters
and things which might have been adjudged and determined by
the County Court in the first instance. It was, therefore, without
jurisdiction to grant the relief awarded in the decree. It was said
that the relief prayed for in the petition filed in the County Court
should have been sought in a separate proceeding filed in the District Court wherein the contract might have been reformed and
specific performance ordered in the one action.
The cases of Oriental Refining Co. v. Hallenbeck, 240 P. 2d
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913 and Light v. Rogers, 242 P. 2d 234 are interesting and informative for the recognition and application of the parol evidence rule.
In each of the cases, the Court held that parol evidence was inadmissable to alter the terms of a contract which on its face was
definite and certain.
The case of Wright v. Nelson, 242 P. 2d 243, involved
what was contended to have been a conveyance to delay, hinder and defraud creditors. The case is considerably important
for the complete discussion of fraudulent conveyances and the elements thereof which appear in the decision. In reversing the
judgment of the District Court, the Court held that the plaintiff
had failed to sustain by a preponderance of the evidence the burden
of overcoming the usual presumption of validity which attends all
sales, and went on to hold that to justify setting aside a conveyance
to hinder and delay a creditor it must appear that the hindering
and delaying was intended to be produced by the grantor through
covin, malice or for the grantor's benefit and advantage, and in
addition it must also appear that the grantee participated in or
had knowledge of the grantor's intent. A secret intent entertained
by a grantor to defraud creditors of which the grantee is ignorant
does not taint the transfer with invalidity. The transfer there attacked was not one which fell within the statute which places on
the parties thereto the burden of proving the bona fide of a transaction. It was further held in that case that for purposes of the
three year statute of limitation that a party is charged with knowledge of a fraudulent transfer as of the date when he became possessed of the means to detect the fraud and that possession of the
means of detecting a fraud is equivalent to knowledge of the fraud.
Weinchel v. Adamic, 242 P. 2d' 219, presents another in the
increasing list of cases wherein our Court has held that exemplary
damages may not be awarded under the provisions of our statute,
where the action sounds in contract. In this case the jury was instructed on the issue of exemplary damage and returned a verdict
therefor in favor of the plaintiff. The facts were that Weinchel,
who had agreed to purchase cattle from Adamic, agreed to pay for
the animals on the basis of their weight after they had gone without food and water for twelve hours. The cattle were weighed and
paid for and taken by the purchaser who thereafter stopped payment on the check which he had given the seller, justifying his actions on the contention that the cattle, during the twelve hour
period preceding the determination of their weight, had been fed
and watered, contrary to the contract. The Court was of the opinion
that there was little or no evidence in the case from which the jury
might conclude that the seller had breached his contract in this
regard; and appeared inclined to accept the seller's verision of the
case that payment of the check was stopped by the purchaser for
the purpose of negotiating and procuring a more favorable price.
The Court's views on the evidence adduced at the trial are significant in indicating its attitude on the question of awarding exemplary damages in cases sounding in contract. As viewed by the
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Court, the facts were not closely disputed, and certainly the case
presented aggravated circumstances wherein, if exemplary damages are ever to be awarded for breach of a contract, they might
well here have been allowed.
The case of Greenwood v. Kier, 234 P. 2d 417, is important for
the able discussion and review of the authorities which appears in
the opinion on the question of the family car doctrine, concededly
predicated on an agency. The doctrine, the Court points out, is of
comparatively recent origin and has enjoyed rapid growth and extension. One of the questions presented was whether or not the
doctrine would be extended to include a case where, from the facts,
it appeared that the title to the vehicle claimed to have been a
family car was in the name of a corporation; that the vehicle was
used primarily in the conduct of the corporate business; and that
the principal officer of the corporation and the one who directed
its activities was the wife of the man to whom the vehicle had been
loaned for the purpose of a hunting expedition, in which the corporation had no interest. Generally speaking, the family car doctrine has been limited to cases in which the car was kept and maintained by the head of a family for the general use, pleasure and convenience of members of the family. While the Court does not specifically hold that the owner of the car or the one who has the primary
control of its use must necessarily be the head of a family to constitute the vehicle a family car, it does nevertheless observe that the
efforts of the plaintiff to establish this fact failed, and further notes
that evidence to the effect that the husband was not employed at
the time of the accident creates no presumption that he was not the
head of a family and discharging his obligations as such. Cases are
cited in which it appeared that the title to a vehicle was vested in
a corporation which was under the control of a person who was
also the head of a family who also had the exclusive custody, control
and use of the car, which was used as a family car, wherein it
has been held that notwithstanding that the title was in the corporation the vehicle was a family car. In each of the cases relied upon
by the Court, however, the car was either owned by the head of a
family or its use as a family car was made available by the head
of the family. Whether one who is not the head of a family who
maintains an automobile for use by members of the family would be
liable under the family car doctrine is not decided; yet language
appears in the opinion which would indicate that this is a rule
which the Court might be somewhat reluctant to adopt.
In the same action the plaintiff sought to recover damages from
the corporation which owned the vehicle involved in the accident
on the theory that at the time it was loaned to the driver thereof
he was intoxicated, a fact which was well known to the officers of
the corporation who made the bailment. The Court recognized the
general rule that a bailor is not liable for the negligent acts of his
bailee. In its charge to the jury on this aspect of this case, the trial
court instructed in effect that unless the jury found that at the time
of the bailment the officers of the corporation knew that the bailee
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was intoxicated and that in his intoxicated condition he intended
to operate the vehicle on the highways, that they should find for
the defendant corporation. This the Supreme Court held to be a
correct statement of the law. It may well be questioned if the trial
court's charge to the jury was broad enough or sufficiently detailed to present for the jury's determination the issue of the
bailor's liability predicated on the doctrine that one who bails a
dangerous instrumentality to a bailee who, because of his incompetence, should not have been entrusted with the use of the thing
bailed, will be answerable for the damages sustained by third persons as a consequence of the bailment. Here, of course, the bailor's
liability is predicated on his own negligence and not on that of the
bailee which might be imputed to him because of the relationship
of the parties arising from the contract of bailment.
A novel case and one of considerable interest is that of Panhandle Co. v. Pressey & Son, 243 P 2d 756, with the discussion of
which I shall conclude this article. There the Panhandle Company,
who dealt in second hand iron, contracted to sell Oliver some used
well casing at an agreed price to be paid upon delivery of the pipe
in Boise City, Oklahoma. The pipe was taken on one of the employer's trucks by an employee, French, to Boise City where he met
Oliver who had a truck and driver available for the transfer thereof.
The pipe was unloaded from the Panhandle Company's truck and
delivered to Oliver who affixed his signature to the original of the
sales ticket which had been made covering the transaction. French,
the seller's agent, demanded payment in full for the pipe, but
Oliver explained that he had left at such an early hour that he had
been unable to procure a cashier's check from the bank to make
the payment and assured French that he would on the following
day mail a check therefor to the Panhandle Company. French advised Oliver that he was without authority to deliver the pipe except
that he receive payment and before permitting Oliver to depart
with the pipe he would have to procure authority therefor from his
employer, which he attempted to do. French was unable to reach
his principal by telephone and upon returning to the place where
the pipe had been delivered could find neither Oliver, Oliver's truck,
nor the pipe. Subsequently, the Panhandle Company learned that
Oliver had left Boise City and had proceeded to Pressey's place of
business in Colorado and had there sold the pipe. The case involved
an action in replevin by the Panhandle Company against Pressey,
the purchaser of the pipe from Oliver, for the recovery thereof.
The judgment of the trial court which was against the Panhandle Company was reversed on the theory that under the terms
of a contract, such as the one made between plaintiff and Oliver,
which was for the sale of personal property for cash, the title to
the property purchased does not pass to the purchaser unless the
payment is received upon the delivery or is specifically waived by
the seller. One who purchases property and pays a valuable consideration therefor to a seller who in turn has acquired no title
because of his failure to pay the purchase price upon which the
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sale was conditioned acquires no right in the property which is valid
as against the claims of the initial seller. There are exceptions to
the rule which the Court recognized where some muniment of title
is by the initial seller placed in the hands of the purchaser on which
a subsequent purchaser relies. In such a case the rule that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss arising from the
culpability of a third person, he whose carelessness or negligence
made the loss possible must bear the loss.
This completes a review of the more important and novel
cases decided in the past year on the subjects assigned. Needless
to say, all of the adjudicated cases are of importance. Only those
in which novel or interesting questions have appeared have been
noted and the omission of any one case from this discussion should
not be regarded as a conclusion of the writer that the omitted case is
wanting in importance, but rather that the issues of law presented,
discussed and applied do not present the novelty which would make
them of interest in this type of paper.

CRIMINAL LAW
M. E. H. SMITH

The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled on approximately
twenty cases in the field of criminal law during the past year. The
majority of these cases have been the usual run of the mill raising
no new points or issues for consideration by our Court. However,
there are eight which deserve comment at this time.
I should like to call your attention to the case of People v.
Dolph.' You will recall that this case had considerable publicity,
and involved one of the councilmen of the City of Denver. Councilman Dolph was allegedly trafficking in the sale of a liquor license.
He was apprehended and arrested when he received $500 in the
basement of a drug store. As a result, he was charged with confidence game and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses.
The confidence game was disposed of under a common principle and
is not noteworthy in the case. The trial court ruled that there is no
crime of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses and dismissed the case. The state appealed and the Supreme Court held
that while the facts showed violations of all concepts of ethics and
decency, still, in the State of Colorado there is no crime of attempted false pretenses since there is no specific statute enacting
it and there was no crime such as this known to the common law
as of 1607.
Both Block v People,2 and Kallnback v. People,3 were cases of
causing death of a person while operating an automobile under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. In the Block case the question was
raised concerning the obtaining of a sample of blood for an alcohol
test while the defendant was unconscious. In the Kallnback case
'239 P. 2d 312, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 17, 1951).
- 240 P. 2d 512, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
1242 P. 2d 222, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 4, 1952).

